@inproceedings{5e73f6efc1a14e7ba493e787ece56972,
title = "Efficiently Computing Equilibria in Budget-Aggregation Games",
abstract = "Budget aggregation deals with the social choice problem of distributing an exogenously given budget among a set of public projects, given agents{\textquoteright} preferences. Taking a game-theoretic perspective, we study budget-aggregation games where each agent has virtual decision power over some fraction of the budget. We investigate the structure and show efficient computability of Nash equilibria for various common preference models in this setting. In particular, we show that equilibria for Leontief utilities can be found in polynomial time, solving an open problem from Brandt et al. [15], and give an explicit polynomial-time algorithm for computing equilibria for ℓ1 preferences.",
keywords = "Budget aggregation, Equilibrium computation, Nash equilibrium",
author = "Patrick Becker and Alexander Fries and Matthias Greger and Erel Segal-Halevi",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2026 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.; 25th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2026 ; Conference date: 25-05-2026 Through 29-05-2026",
year = "2026",
month = may,
day = "24",
doi = "10.65109/CCMB1463",
language = "אנגלית",
series = "AAMAS 2026 - Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems",
pages = "1304--1313",
booktitle = "AAMAS 2026 - Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems",
}