דילוג לניווט ראשי דילוג לחיפוש דילוג לתוכן הראשי

Don't blame me: A theory of politicians choosing policy advisors

  • Arthur Fishman
  • , Doron Klunover

פרסום מחקרי: פרסום בכתב עת › מאמר › ביקורת עמיתים

1 ציטוט ‏(Scopus)

תקציר

We present a model in which an imperfectly informed politician chooses between appointing an independent expert, whose advice is revealed to voters, and a loyal expert whose advice can be concealed from voters and who can therefore be blamed for a bad outcome. The politician is privately informed about which expert is more competent while Bayesian voters update beliefs about the expert's competence based on which expert is chosen and the outcome of the policy chosen by the politician. Voters are distributed such that some are biased toward a certain policy while others are not. We show that, under a majority voting rule, in equilibrium, the politician is unable to increase his chances of reelection by choosing the loyal expert and trying to shift the blame for a bad outcome on him.

שפה מקוריתאנגלית
מספר המאמר100076
כתב עתJournal of Government and Economics
כרך10
מזהי עצם דיגיטלי (DOIs)
סטטוס פרסוםפורסם - 1 יוני 2023
פורסם באופן חיצוניכן

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