Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection

Guy Elaad; Artyom Jelnov

doi:10.1007/s11238-018-9669-5

Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection

Guy Elaad
, Artyom Jelnov

כלכלה ומנהל עסקים

פרסום מחקרי: פרסום בכתב עת › מאמר › ביקורת עמיתים

1 ציטוט ‏(Scopus)

תקציר

We analyze a game between three players: two Athletes and an Inspector. Two athletes compete with each other and both may cheat to increase their chances of victory. The Inspector wishes to detect incidents of cheating, and performs tests on athletes to detect cheating. The test is costly for the Inspector. Both probability of cheating and that of testing decrease as cost of inspection diminishes.

שפה מקורית	אנגלית
עמודים (מ-עד)	375-387
מספר עמודים	13
כתב עת	Theory and Decision
כרך	85
מספר גיליון	3-4
מזהי עצם דיגיטלי (DOIs)	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-018-9669-5
סטטוס פרסום	פורסם - 1 אוק׳ 2018

גישה למסמך

10.1007/s11238-018-9669-5

קבצים וקישורים אחרים

Link to publication in Scopus

פורמט ציטוט ביבליוגרפי

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abstract = "We analyze a game between three players: two Athletes and an Inspector. Two athletes compete with each other and both may cheat to increase their chances of victory. The Inspector wishes to detect incidents of cheating, and performs tests on athletes to detect cheating. The test is costly for the Inspector. Both probability of cheating and that of testing decrease as cost of inspection diminishes.",

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AB - We analyze a game between three players: two Athletes and an Inspector. Two athletes compete with each other and both may cheat to increase their chances of victory. The Inspector wishes to detect incidents of cheating, and performs tests on athletes to detect cheating. The test is costly for the Inspector. Both probability of cheating and that of testing decrease as cost of inspection diminishes.

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Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection

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