Analyzing HtTPS encrypted traffic to identify user's operating system, browser and application

Jonathan Muehlstein, Yehonatan Zion, Maor Bahumi, Itay Kirshenboim, Ran Dubin, Amit Dvir, Ofir Pele

פרסום מחקרי: פרק בספר / בדוח / בכנספרסום בספר כנסביקורת עמיתים

46 ציטוטים ‏(Scopus)

תקציר

Desktops and laptops can be maliciously exploited to violate privacy. There are two main types of attack scenarios: active and passive. In this paper, we consider the passive scenario where the adversary does not interact actively with the device, but he is able to eavesdrop on the network traffic of the device from the network side. Most of the internet traffic is encrypted and thus passive attacks are challenging. In this paper, we show that an external attacker can identify the operating system, browser and application of HTTP encrypted traffic (HTTPS). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that shows this. We provide a large data set of more than 20000 examples for this task. Additionally, we suggest new features for this task. We run a through a set of experiments, which shows that our classification accuracy is 96.06%.

שפה מקוריתאנגלית
כותר פרסום המארח2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017
מוציא לאורInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
מסת"ב (אלקטרוני)9781509061969
מזהי עצם דיגיטלי (DOIs)
סטטוס פרסוםפורסם - 17 יולי 2017
אירוע14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017 - Las Vegas, ארצות הברית
משך הזמן: 8 ינו׳ 201711 ינו׳ 2017

סדרות פרסומים

שם2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017
כרך2017-January

כנס

כנס14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017
מדינה/אזורארצות הברית
עירLas Vegas
תקופה8/01/1711/01/17

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