Warum wurde nach dem Sechstagekrieg kein Friede erreicht?

Despite expectations among many Israeli citizens and political leaders in the summer of 1967 that the Israel Defence Forces stellar military victory in the recent Arab-Israeli war (the Six-Day War) would quickly bring Arab leaders to the negotiating table to hammer out a post-war peace settlement, the dismissive September 1967 resolutions of the fourth Arab League Summit in Khartoum clearly indicated that this would not be the case. This article considers the ostensive contradiction between the Israeli government's declared willingness to give up most of the occupied territories in exchange for peace on the one hand, and its concurrent settlement and annexation activities in these territories on the other hand, with an emphasis on the consistency of Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's conditions for reaching a settlement with Israel's Arab adversaries after the war. Based on a comprehensive historical study of the literature and the relevant archival documents from this period, the article highlights the importance of these conditions - which included direct negotiations with the leadership of the Arab countries in question, a non-return to the pre-war borders, and full recognition of the state of Israel by the governments in question - in understanding the logic that underlay Israel's position at home and in the international arena until Eshkol's death in 1969.