Too-Big-to-Fail, Government Bailouts, and Managerial Incentives: The Case of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to the Railroad Industry during the Great Depression

Daniel Schiffman; Joseph Mason

Too-Big-to-Fail, Government Bailouts, and Managerial Incentives: The Case of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to the Railroad Industry during the Great Depression

Daniel Schiffman
, Joseph Mason

Department of Economics and Business Administration

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Too-Big-to-Fail: Policies and Practices in Government Bailouts
Editors	Benton Gup
Pages	49-75
State	Published - 2004

Access to Document

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1337203

Cite this

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title = "Too-Big-to-Fail, Government Bailouts, and Managerial Incentives: The Case of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to the Railroad Industry during the Great Depression",

author = "Daniel Schiffman and Joseph Mason",

year = "2004",

language = "English",

pages = "49--75",

editor = "Benton Gup",

booktitle = "Too-Big-to-Fail: Policies and Practices in Government Bailouts",

}

Too-Big-to-Fail, Government Bailouts, and Managerial Incentives: The Case of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to the Railroad Industry during the Great Depression. / Schiffman, Daniel; Mason, Joseph.
Too-Big-to-Fail: Policies and Practices in Government Bailouts. ed. / Benton Gup. 2004. p. 49-75.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

TY - CHAP

T1 - Too-Big-to-Fail, Government Bailouts, and Managerial Incentives: The Case of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to the Railroad Industry during the Great Depression

AU - Schiffman, Daniel

AU - Mason, Joseph

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

M3 - Chapter

SP - 49

EP - 75

BT - Too-Big-to-Fail: Policies and Practices in Government Bailouts

A2 - Gup, Benton

ER -