The private value of a patent: A cooperative approach

Artyom Jelnov, Yair Tauman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations


We consider a game in coalitional form played by the firms of a Cournot industry and an outside patent holder of a cost-reducing innovation. The worth of a coalition of players is the total Cournot profit of the active firms within this coalition. The number of firms that a coalition activates is determined by the Nash equilibrium of the game played by the coalition and its complement, where the strategy of each is the number of firms to be activated. Only firms in a coalition containing the patent holder are allowed to use the new technology. We prove that when the industry size increases indefinitely, the Shapley value of the patent holder approximates the payoff he obtains in a standard non-cooperative setup where he has the entire bargaining power. We also examine a partition game which considers for every coalition all structures of its complement, namely all partitions of the complement into sub-coalitions. The coalition and every sub-coalition of the complement simultaneously decide how many of their firms to be activated. We prove a similar equivalence result for an extension of the Shapley value from coalitional games to partition games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)84-97
Number of pages14
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jul 2009
Externally publishedYes


  • Game theory
  • Patent licensing
  • Shapley value


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