TY - GEN

T1 - The Effect of Expected Revenue Proportion and Social Value Orientation Index on Players’ Behavior in Divergent Interest Tacit Coordination Games

AU - Mizrahi, Dor

AU - Laufer, Ilan

AU - Zuckerman, Inon

N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - Tacit coordination games are games in which players need to coordinate with one another, for example, on how to divide resources, while they are not allowed to communicate with each other. In divergent interest tacit coordination games, their interests are not always aligned. For instance, player may need to choose between a solution that maximizes their individual profit or a solution that is perceptually more salient to both players, i.e., a focal point, that will increase the chances for successful coordination. The goal of this study was to examine the effect of two key variables, the Expected Revenue Proportions (ERP) and the player's Social Value Orientation (SVO) on the probability of realizing a focal point solution in divergent interest tacit coordination games. Our results show that there is an interaction between the expected payoff and the SVO. For example, prosocial players tend to implement a social point solution although the expected payoff is less than that of their opponent. Thus, the implementation of a focal point depends on other contextual variables such as the SVO and the expected payoff. The main contribution of this work is showing that the probability to choose a focal point solution is affected by the interaction between SVO and the expected revenue of the player. This finding may contribute to the construction of cognitive models for decision making in diverge interest tacit coordination problems.

AB - Tacit coordination games are games in which players need to coordinate with one another, for example, on how to divide resources, while they are not allowed to communicate with each other. In divergent interest tacit coordination games, their interests are not always aligned. For instance, player may need to choose between a solution that maximizes their individual profit or a solution that is perceptually more salient to both players, i.e., a focal point, that will increase the chances for successful coordination. The goal of this study was to examine the effect of two key variables, the Expected Revenue Proportions (ERP) and the player's Social Value Orientation (SVO) on the probability of realizing a focal point solution in divergent interest tacit coordination games. Our results show that there is an interaction between the expected payoff and the SVO. For example, prosocial players tend to implement a social point solution although the expected payoff is less than that of their opponent. Thus, the implementation of a focal point depends on other contextual variables such as the SVO and the expected payoff. The main contribution of this work is showing that the probability to choose a focal point solution is affected by the interaction between SVO and the expected revenue of the player. This finding may contribute to the construction of cognitive models for decision making in diverge interest tacit coordination problems.

KW - Decision making

KW - Divergent interest

KW - SVO; cognitive modeling

KW - Tacit coordination games

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85115835920&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-86993-9_3

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-86993-9_3

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AN - SCOPUS:85115835920

SN - 9783030869922

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 25

EP - 34

BT - Brain Informatics - 14th International Conference, BI 2021, Proceedings

A2 - Mahmud, Mufti

A2 - Kaiser, M Shamim

A2 - Vassanelli, Stefano

A2 - Dai, Qionghai

A2 - Zhong, Ning

PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH

T2 - 14th International Conference on Brain Informatics, BI 2021

Y2 - 17 September 2021 through 19 September 2021

ER -