Suicide intention and suicide prevention: An economic perspective

Suicide has long been recognized as a major public health problem. Suicide prevention, through the provision of ambulatory crisis therapy which, if successful, eliminates the desire to die, or through protective hospitalization which, first and foremost, eliminates the opportunities, is thus part of society's resource allocation problem. A prerequisite for undertaking either of these measures is that suicide-contemplating individuals apply for help. The present paper addresses the individual's problem of whether to commit suicide or to apply for last-minute help, as well as the mental health practitioner's problem of whether to hospitalize a suicide-threatening individual or to offer him ambulatory crisis therapy. While the individual faces the risk of involuntary hospitalization, the practitioner faces the risk of suicide. Acting as a cost-oriented social welfare agent, the practitioner bases his decision on the likelihood that the suicide threat is genuine, so as to minimize society's expected loss from suicide and suicide-prevention efforts. The paper analyzes the interaction between the suicidal individual and the mental health practitioner within a simple game-theoretic framework, deriving both parties' equilibrium strategies as well as implications for public health policy aimed at enhancing help-seeking behavior.