Strategic signaling for selling information goods

Shani Alkoby, David Sarne, Igal Milchtaich

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

1 Scopus citations


This paper studies the benefit in using signaling by an information seller holding information that can completely disambiguate some uncertainty concerning the state of the world for the information buyer. We show that a necessary condition for having the information seller benefit from signaling in this model is having some “seed of truth” in the signaling scheme used. We then introduce two natural signaling mechanisms that adhere to this condition, one where the seller pre-commits to the signaling scheme to be used and the other where she commits to use a signaling scheme that contains a “seed of truth”. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium resulting from each and show that, somehow counter-intuitively, despite the inherent differences between the two mechanisms, they are equivalent in the sense that for any equilibrium associated with the maximum revenue in one there is an equilibrium offering the seller the same revenue in the other.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
EditorsSarit Kraus
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241141
StatePublished - 2019
Event28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019 - Macao, China
Duration: 10 Aug 201916 Aug 2019

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN (Print)1045-0823


Conference28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019


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