Speed limits

Artyom Jelnov; Doron Klunover

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110368

Speed limits

Artyom Jelnov, Doron Klunover

Department of Economics and Business Administration

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider a model in which a regulator determines the level of an activity – which is harmful to society – beyond which an agent will pay a fixed fine. We show that the regulator adopts a random punishment scheme under certain conditions in order to minimize harm. The results may help to solve the puzzle of why vague enforcement policies are implemented by competent governments even when tough enforcement is possible and costless.

Original language	English
Article number	110368
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	213
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110368
State	Published - Apr 2022

Keywords

Law enforcement
Random strategy

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110368

Cite this

@article{621c43f39f22423197c61380992bcd94,

title = "Speed limits",

abstract = "We consider a model in which a regulator determines the level of an activity – which is harmful to society – beyond which an agent will pay a fixed fine. We show that the regulator adopts a random punishment scheme under certain conditions in order to minimize harm. The results may help to solve the puzzle of why vague enforcement policies are implemented by competent governments even when tough enforcement is possible and costless.",

keywords = "Law enforcement, Random strategy",

author = "Artyom Jelnov and Doron Klunover",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2022",

month = apr,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110368",

language = "אנגלית",

volume = "213",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Speed limits

AU - Jelnov, Artyom

AU - Klunover, Doron

PY - 2022/4

Y1 - 2022/4

N2 - We consider a model in which a regulator determines the level of an activity – which is harmful to society – beyond which an agent will pay a fixed fine. We show that the regulator adopts a random punishment scheme under certain conditions in order to minimize harm. The results may help to solve the puzzle of why vague enforcement policies are implemented by competent governments even when tough enforcement is possible and costless.

AB - We consider a model in which a regulator determines the level of an activity – which is harmful to society – beyond which an agent will pay a fixed fine. We show that the regulator adopts a random punishment scheme under certain conditions in order to minimize harm. The results may help to solve the puzzle of why vague enforcement policies are implemented by competent governments even when tough enforcement is possible and costless.

KW - Law enforcement

KW - Random strategy

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85125123027&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110368

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110368

M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???

AN - SCOPUS:85125123027

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 213

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

M1 - 110368

ER -

Speed limits

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this