TY - JOUR
T1 - Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion
AU - Gradwohl, Ronen
AU - Hahn, Niklas
AU - Hoefer, Martin
AU - Smorodinsky, Rann
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper, we study a setting with multiple senders, in which the receiver is restricted to choosing, at the interim stage, one sender with whom to interact. Our main result is that whenever senders are uncertain about each other's preferences, and, in particular, cannot dismiss with certainty the possibility that others are aligned with the receiver, the receiver receives all the informational surplus in all equilibria.
AB - The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper, we study a setting with multiple senders, in which the receiver is restricted to choosing, at the interim stage, one sender with whom to interact. Our main result is that whenever senders are uncertain about each other's preferences, and, in particular, cannot dismiss with certainty the possibility that others are aligned with the receiver, the receiver receives all the informational surplus in all equilibria.
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SN - 1945-7669
JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
ER -