PSImple: Practical Multiparty Maliciously-Secure Private Set Intersection. Practical Multiparty Maliciously-Secure Private Set

Aner Ben-Efraim, Olga Nissenbaum, Eran Omri, Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

16 Scopus citations

Abstract

Private set intersection (PSI) protocols allow a set of mutually distrustful parties, each holding a private set of items, to compute the intersection over all their sets, such that no other information is revealed. PSI has a wide variety of applications including online advertising (e.g., efficacy computation), security (e.g., botnet detection, intrusion detection), proximity testing (e.g., COVID-19 contact tracing), and more. Private set intersection is a rapidly developing area and there exist many highly efficient protocols. However, almost all of these protocols are for the case of two parties or for semi-honest security. In particular, despite the high interest in this problem, prior to our work there has been no concretely efficient, maliciously secure multiparty PSI protocol. We present PSImple, the first concretely efficient maliciously-secure multiparty PSI protocol. Our construction is based on oblivious transfer and garbled Bloom filters, and has a round-optimal online phase. To demonstrate the practicality of PSImple, we implemented it and ran experiments with up to 32 parties and 2 20 inputs. We show that PSImple is competitive even with the state-of-the-art concretely efficient semi-honest multiparty PSI protocols. Additionally, we revisit the garbled Bloom filter parameters used in the 2-party PSI protocol of Rindal and Rosulek (Eurocrypt 2017). Using a more careful analysis, we show that the size of the garbled Bloom filters and the number of oblivious transfers required for malicious security can be significantly reduced, often by more than 20%. These improved parameters also imply a better security guarantee, and can be used both in the 2-party PSI protocol of Rindal and Rosulek and in i>PSImple.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationASIA CCS 2022 - Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Pages1098-1112
Number of pages15
ISBN (Electronic)9781450391405
DOIs
StatePublished - 30 May 2022
Event17th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2022, ASIA CCS 2022 - Virtual, Online, Japan
Duration: 30 May 20223 Jun 2022

Publication series

NameASIA CCS 2022 - Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Conference

Conference17th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2022, ASIA CCS 2022
Country/TerritoryJapan
CityVirtual, Online
Period30/05/223/06/22

Keywords

  • concrete efficiency
  • garbled bloom filters
  • malicious security
  • private set intersection
  • secure multiparty computation
  • uc-security

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