Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice

Nava Kahana; Doron Klunover

doi:10.1007/s00355-016-0968-x

Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice

Nava Kahana
, Doron Klunover

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

When individuals with the same preferences but different abilities and non-labor incomes allocate time between leisure and labor and contribute to a pure public good, the order of the contributors’ equilibrium utilities in the Nash equilibrium is a perfect inversion of the order of their abilities, and the supply of the public good is not neutral to the ability distribution.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	379-386
Number of pages	8
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	47
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0968-x
State	Published - 1 Aug 2016
Externally published	Yes

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AB - When individuals with the same preferences but different abilities and non-labor incomes allocate time between leisure and labor and contribute to a pure public good, the order of the contributors’ equilibrium utilities in the Nash equilibrium is a perfect inversion of the order of their abilities, and the supply of the public good is not neutral to the ability distribution.

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Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice

Abstract

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