Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice

Nava Kahana, Doron Klunover

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations


When individuals with the same preferences but different abilities and non-labor incomes allocate time between leisure and labor and contribute to a pure public good, the order of the contributors’ equilibrium utilities in the Nash equilibrium is a perfect inversion of the order of their abilities, and the supply of the public good is not neutral to the ability distribution.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)379-386
Number of pages8
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1 Aug 2016
Externally publishedYes


Dive into the research topics of 'Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this