TY - JOUR
T1 - Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice
AU - Kahana, Nava
AU - Klunover, Doron
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
PY - 2016/8/1
Y1 - 2016/8/1
N2 - When individuals with the same preferences but different abilities and non-labor incomes allocate time between leisure and labor and contribute to a pure public good, the order of the contributors’ equilibrium utilities in the Nash equilibrium is a perfect inversion of the order of their abilities, and the supply of the public good is not neutral to the ability distribution.
AB - When individuals with the same preferences but different abilities and non-labor incomes allocate time between leisure and labor and contribute to a pure public good, the order of the contributors’ equilibrium utilities in the Nash equilibrium is a perfect inversion of the order of their abilities, and the supply of the public good is not neutral to the ability distribution.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84969922146&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00355-016-0968-x
DO - 10.1007/s00355-016-0968-x
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AN - SCOPUS:84969922146
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 47
SP - 379
EP - 386
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 2
ER -