TY - GEN
T1 - Prediction-Sharing During Training and Inference
AU - Gafni, Yotam
AU - Gradwohl, Ronen
AU - Tennenholtz, Moshe
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Two firms are engaged in a competitive prediction task. Each firm has two sources of data—labeled historical data and unlabeled inference-time data—and uses the former to derive a prediction model and the latter to make predictions on new instances. We study data-sharing contracts between the firms. The novelty of our study is to introduce and highlight the differences between contracts to share prediction models only, contracts to share inference-time predictions only, and contracts to share both. Our analysis proceeds on three levels. First, we develop a general Bayesian framework that facilitates our study. Second, we narrow our focus to two natural settings within this framework: (i) a setting in which the accuracy of each firm’s prediction model is common knowledge, but the correlation between the respective models is unknown; and (ii) a setting in which two hypotheses exist regarding the optimal predictor, and one of the firms has a structural advantage in deducing it. Within these two settings we study optimal contract choice. More specifically, we find the individually rational and Pareto-optimal contracts for some notable cases, and describe specific settings where each of the different sharing contracts is optimal. Finally, on the third level of our analysis we demonstrate the applicability of our concepts in a synthetic simulation using real loan data.
AB - Two firms are engaged in a competitive prediction task. Each firm has two sources of data—labeled historical data and unlabeled inference-time data—and uses the former to derive a prediction model and the latter to make predictions on new instances. We study data-sharing contracts between the firms. The novelty of our study is to introduce and highlight the differences between contracts to share prediction models only, contracts to share inference-time predictions only, and contracts to share both. Our analysis proceeds on three levels. First, we develop a general Bayesian framework that facilitates our study. Second, we narrow our focus to two natural settings within this framework: (i) a setting in which the accuracy of each firm’s prediction model is common knowledge, but the correlation between the respective models is unknown; and (ii) a setting in which two hypotheses exist regarding the optimal predictor, and one of the firms has a structural advantage in deducing it. Within these two settings we study optimal contract choice. More specifically, we find the individually rational and Pareto-optimal contracts for some notable cases, and describe specific settings where each of the different sharing contracts is optimal. Finally, on the third level of our analysis we demonstrate the applicability of our concepts in a synthetic simulation using real loan data.
KW - Data Sharing
KW - Information Sharing
KW - Strategic Classification
KW - Strategic Machine Learning
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85204356997&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-71033-9_24
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-71033-9_24
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AN - SCOPUS:85204356997
SN - 9783031710322
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 425
EP - 442
BT - Algorithmic Game Theory - 17th International Symposium, SAGT 2024, Proceedings
A2 - Schäfer, Guido
A2 - Ventre, Carmine
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - 17th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2024
Y2 - 3 September 2024 through 6 September 2024
ER -