TY - GEN
T1 - PINE
T2 - 33rd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2024
AU - Rothblum, Guy N.
AU - Omri, Eran
AU - Chen, Junye
AU - Talwar, Kunal
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© USENIX Security Symposium 2024.All rights reserved.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Secure aggregation of high-dimensional vectors is a fundamental primitive in federated statistics and learning. A two-server system such as PRIO allows for scalable aggregation of secret-shared vectors. Adversarial clients might try to manipulate the aggregate, so it is important to ensure that each (secret-shared) contribution is well-formed. In this work, we focus on the important and well-studied goal of ensuring that each contribution vector has bounded Euclidean norm. Existing protocols for ensuring bounded-norm contributions either incur a large communication overhead, or only allow for approximate verification of the norm bound. We propose Private Inexpensive Norm Enforcement (PINE): a new protocol that allows exact norm verification with little communication overhead. For high-dimensional vectors, our approach has a communication overhead of a few percent, compared to the 16-32x overhead of previous approaches.
AB - Secure aggregation of high-dimensional vectors is a fundamental primitive in federated statistics and learning. A two-server system such as PRIO allows for scalable aggregation of secret-shared vectors. Adversarial clients might try to manipulate the aggregate, so it is important to ensure that each (secret-shared) contribution is well-formed. In this work, we focus on the important and well-studied goal of ensuring that each contribution vector has bounded Euclidean norm. Existing protocols for ensuring bounded-norm contributions either incur a large communication overhead, or only allow for approximate verification of the norm bound. We propose Private Inexpensive Norm Enforcement (PINE): a new protocol that allows exact norm verification with little communication overhead. For high-dimensional vectors, our approach has a communication overhead of a few percent, compared to the 16-32x overhead of previous approaches.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85202035209&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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AN - SCOPUS:85202035209
T3 - Proceedings of the 33rd USENIX Security Symposium
SP - 6975
EP - 6992
BT - Proceedings of the 33rd USENIX Security Symposium
Y2 - 14 August 2024 through 16 August 2024
ER -