TY - GEN
T1 - MUDA
T2 - 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018
AU - Segal-Halevi, Erel
AU - Hassidim, Avinatan
AU - Aumann, Yonatan
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee's mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single unit and each buyer to buy a single unit. This paper presents a double-auction mechanism that handles multi-parametric agents and allows multiple units per trader, as long as the valuation functions of all traders have decreasing marginal returns. The mechanism is prior-free, ex-post individually-rational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly-budget-balanced. Its gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market size is sufficiently large.
AB - In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee's mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single unit and each buyer to buy a single unit. This paper presents a double-auction mechanism that handles multi-parametric agents and allows multiple units per trader, as long as the valuation functions of all traders have decreasing marginal returns. The mechanism is prior-free, ex-post individually-rational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly-budget-balanced. Its gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market size is sufficiently large.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85053250051&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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AN - SCOPUS:85053250051
T3 - 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018
SP - 1193
EP - 1201
BT - 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018
Y2 - 2 February 2018 through 7 February 2018
ER -