Abstract
Motivated by recent deployments of Stackelberg security games (SSGs), two competing approaches have emerged which either integrate models of human decision making into game-theoretic algorithms or apply robust optimization techniques that avoid adversary modeling. Recently, a robust technique (MATCH) has been shown to significantly outperform the leading modeling-based algorithms (e.g., Quantal Response (QR)) even in the presence of significant amounts of subject data. As a result, the effectiveness of using human behaviors in solving SSGs remains in question. We study this question in this paper.
Original language | English |
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Pages | 1297-1298 |
Number of pages | 2 |
State | Published - 2013 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013 - Saint Paul, MN, United States Duration: 6 May 2013 → 10 May 2013 |
Conference
Conference | 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Saint Paul, MN |
Period | 6/05/13 → 10/05/13 |
Keywords
- Bounded Rationality
- Game Theory
- Human Behavior
- Quantal Response
- Robust Optimization