TY - GEN
T1 - Interactive Non-malleable Codes
AU - Fleischhacker, Nils
AU - Goyal, Vipul
AU - Jain, Abhishek
AU - Paskin-Cherniavsky, Anat
AU - Radune, Slava
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, International Association for Cryptologic Research.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - Non-malleable codes (NMC) introduced by Dziembowski et al. [ICS’10] allow one to encode “passive” data in such a manner that when a codeword is tampered, the original data either remains completely intact or is essentially destroyed. In this work, we initiate the study of interactive non-malleable codes (INMCs) that allow for encoding “active communication” rather than passive data. An INMC allows two parties to engage in an interactive protocol such that an adversary who is able to tamper with the protocol messages either leaves the original transcript intact (i.e., the parties are able to reconstruct the original transcript) or the transcript is completely destroyed and replaced with an unrelated one. We formalize a tampering model for interactive protocols and put forward the notion of INMCs. Since constructing INMCs for general adversaries is impossible (as in the case of non-malleable codes), we construct INMCs for several specific classes of tampering functions. These include bounded state, split state, and fragmented sliding window tampering functions. We also obtain lower bounds for threshold tampering functions via a connection to interactive coding. All of our results are unconditional.
AB - Non-malleable codes (NMC) introduced by Dziembowski et al. [ICS’10] allow one to encode “passive” data in such a manner that when a codeword is tampered, the original data either remains completely intact or is essentially destroyed. In this work, we initiate the study of interactive non-malleable codes (INMCs) that allow for encoding “active communication” rather than passive data. An INMC allows two parties to engage in an interactive protocol such that an adversary who is able to tamper with the protocol messages either leaves the original transcript intact (i.e., the parties are able to reconstruct the original transcript) or the transcript is completely destroyed and replaced with an unrelated one. We formalize a tampering model for interactive protocols and put forward the notion of INMCs. Since constructing INMCs for general adversaries is impossible (as in the case of non-malleable codes), we construct INMCs for several specific classes of tampering functions. These include bounded state, split state, and fragmented sliding window tampering functions. We also obtain lower bounds for threshold tampering functions via a connection to interactive coding. All of our results are unconditional.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85076961227&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-36033-7_9
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-36033-7_9
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AN - SCOPUS:85076961227
SN - 9783030360320
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 233
EP - 263
BT - Theory of Cryptography - 17th International Conference, TCC 2019, Proceedings
A2 - Hofheinz, Dennis
A2 - Rosen, Alon
T2 - 17th International Conference on Theory of Cryptography, TCC 2019
Y2 - 1 December 2019 through 5 December 2019
ER -