Fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits. A theoretical analysis with reference to income tax evasion

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

The harshest abusers of the unemployment insurance program are those employed who collect benefits while working. This paper analyzes fraudulent claiming behavior and optimal deterrence policy under two alternative penalty schemes, commonly used in tax evasion analyses: one relates punishment to the magnitude of the dishonesty, whereas the other relates punishment to the amount of illegal returns. Two exclusive features of fraudulent benefit claiming are given special attention: the requirement to report at a labor exchange to demonstrate availability for work, and the need to serve a waiting period before benefits can be collected.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)369-383
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume30
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1986
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits. A theoretical analysis with reference to income tax evasion'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this