Electronic digital passport as a means of partial response to the lack of intelligence in the field of border control

International travel has been involved in a significant way in the preparation and execution of terrorist activities. The challenge facing international actors fighting terror and Organized Crime (OC) is twofold: how to better inspect the movement of persons and still impose as little inconvenience on the travelers as possible. This paper deals with the formal and intelligence dimensions: travel documents and their makeup, the border crossing travel documents inspection and the sharing of information among concerned parties. The following discussion deals with some of the more acute areas in this field and offers a model designed to further narrow down the net and yet admitting that it will only add to the necessary security but will not produce the ultimate solution. After observing some of the current pitfalls of the system the paper presents the concept of a credit card size electronic digital passport. The idea is not new, however since it is not yet in use this is the time to characterize the product. Therefore, perhaps the initial element, the one which involves decision on cabinet level should be that all citizens must carry one official identification document. That move will obviously contribute to enhanced security. The only difference between an ID/ED passport and a credit card is not in its appearance, but in its contents. It hides a radio frequency identification, or RFID, chip and many counter forfeiting elements. It is unique in that it is a driver's license, national ID and a national passport at the same time. It does not only say that on the cover and back of the card but it includes on its chip all the necessary data. This card, given the authority in charge, can be read and enact different types of mechanism: the police officer's cruising car terminal, a voting machine, a passport control terminal etc. Obviously, the encryption procedure and the access protocols are distinctive for each level. However, access to changing the contents should be encrypted in a way that several authorities may have access to their own information but never to any other information entered by other bodies. This approach will undoubtedly make forging travel documents expensive and time consuming beyond the usual means of most terror and OC organizations. Moreover, on top of safeguarding the re-writing process the data should be protected by security features embedded in the software and unknown to the officer feeding the machine with the necessary details. Many current national travel documents depend on two elements: a bulky paper document and an RFID chip. The desired end result proposed here will be a new concept of a travel document: a small multipurpose card. The technology alluded to in this paper does exist. Moreover, it is partially in use in the present. It is a matter of further developing the abilities of the embryonic software and integrating many elements into one system.