Dynamics sales discriminate against uninformed consumers in a competitive market

Arthur Fishman

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(88)90213-3

Dynamics sales discriminate against uninformed consumers in a competitive market

Arthur Fishman

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A dynamic version of the Salop and Stiglitz (1977) model of price dispersion is presented whose unique perfect equilibrium is a continuous function of the number of uninformed consumers in the market. In the limit as the number of uninformed consumers approaches zero, the equilibrium approaches the perfectly competitive one.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	23-25
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	27
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(88)90213-3
State	Published - 1988
Externally published	Yes

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title = "Dynamics sales discriminate against uninformed consumers in a competitive market",

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Dynamics sales discriminate against uninformed consumers in a competitive market

Abstract

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