TY - GEN
T1 - Distributed matching with mixed maximum-minimum utilities
AU - Azaria, Amos
AU - Sarner, David
AU - Aumann, Yonatan
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - In this paper we study distributed agent matching in environments characterized by costly exploration, where each agent's utility from forming a partnership is influenced by both the maximum and the minimum among the two agent's competence. This kind of utility function is somehow more applicable, compared to the one used in related work that takes the utility to be either the type of the agent partner or "standard" functions such as average or multiplication of the two types. The use of the hybrid min-max utility function is favorable whenever the performance of the agents forming a partnership is principally affected by the most (or least) competent among the two. This paper supplies a cohesive analysis for the min-max case, proving the equilibrium structure for the different min-max linear combination that may be used. We show that in any case that an agent sets its acceptance threshold below its own type it is guaranteed that any agent with a type between this threshold and its own will accept it (the agent) as a partner as well. This result substantially facilitates the calculation of equilibrium for such settings, e.g., when the set of types is finite.
AB - In this paper we study distributed agent matching in environments characterized by costly exploration, where each agent's utility from forming a partnership is influenced by both the maximum and the minimum among the two agent's competence. This kind of utility function is somehow more applicable, compared to the one used in related work that takes the utility to be either the type of the agent partner or "standard" functions such as average or multiplication of the two types. The use of the hybrid min-max utility function is favorable whenever the performance of the agents forming a partnership is principally affected by the most (or least) competent among the two. This paper supplies a cohesive analysis for the min-max case, proving the equilibrium structure for the different min-max linear combination that may be used. We show that in any case that an agent sets its acceptance threshold below its own type it is guaranteed that any agent with a type between this threshold and its own will accept it (the agent) as a partner as well. This result substantially facilitates the calculation of equilibrium for such settings, e.g., when the set of types is finite.
KW - Distributed matching
KW - game theory
KW - multi agent systems
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84878425971&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/WI-IAT.2012.119
DO - 10.1109/WI-IAT.2012.119
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontobookanthology.conference???
AN - SCOPUS:84878425971
SN - 9780769548807
T3 - Proceedings - 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 2012
SP - 134
EP - 139
BT - Proceedings - 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 2012
T2 - 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 2012
Y2 - 4 December 2012 through 7 December 2012
ER -