TY - JOUR
T1 - Cost Overruns, Winner's Curse, Wisdom of the Crowd, and a Pendulum Effect in Public Construction Tenders
AU - Giat, Yahel
AU - Mitelman, Amichai
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 1973-2011 IEEE.
PY - 2023/6
Y1 - 2023/6
N2 - The 'wisdom of the crowd' is a concept that argues that collective opinion is better than any single (even expert) opinion. The wisdom of the crowd has a particularly important implication in tenders. Consider the scenario of project bidding, where multiple contractors bid for a contract and the winner is the bidder committing for the lowest cost. If the collective bid, i.e., the average bid, is the most accurate in assessing the true value of the contract, then the winning bid is underestimating the contract and, therefore, is expected to end up with a loss, a result known as the 'winner's curse.' While this outcome predicts that project owners will save costs, it is hardly so, as cost overruns are ubiquitous in the construction industry. In this article, we analyzed the cost estimates, contractors' bids, and total payments of 148 government tenders of construction projects. We identified and quantified the three aforementioned phenomena: 1) the wisdom of the crowd, 2) the winner's curse, and 3) cost overruns. Considered together, these phenomena manifest a pendulum effect in which the auction-winning contractor pendulates from a cursed to a blessed state, at the expense of the public's interest.
AB - The 'wisdom of the crowd' is a concept that argues that collective opinion is better than any single (even expert) opinion. The wisdom of the crowd has a particularly important implication in tenders. Consider the scenario of project bidding, where multiple contractors bid for a contract and the winner is the bidder committing for the lowest cost. If the collective bid, i.e., the average bid, is the most accurate in assessing the true value of the contract, then the winning bid is underestimating the contract and, therefore, is expected to end up with a loss, a result known as the 'winner's curse.' While this outcome predicts that project owners will save costs, it is hardly so, as cost overruns are ubiquitous in the construction industry. In this article, we analyzed the cost estimates, contractors' bids, and total payments of 148 government tenders of construction projects. We identified and quantified the three aforementioned phenomena: 1) the wisdom of the crowd, 2) the winner's curse, and 3) cost overruns. Considered together, these phenomena manifest a pendulum effect in which the auction-winning contractor pendulates from a cursed to a blessed state, at the expense of the public's interest.
KW - Construction projects
KW - cost overruns
KW - minimum bid auction
KW - public tenders
KW - winner's curse
KW - wisdom of the crowd
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85153366191&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/EMR.2023.3267388
DO - 10.1109/EMR.2023.3267388
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AN - SCOPUS:85153366191
SN - 0360-8581
VL - 51
SP - 141
EP - 151
JO - IEEE Engineering Management Review
JF - IEEE Engineering Management Review
IS - 2
ER -