Corruption and sensitive soccer games: Cross-country evidence

Guy Elaad, Alex Krumer, Jeffrey Kantor

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Scopus citations


We utilize data from sensitive soccer games in 75 countries between the years 2001 and 2013. In these games one team was in immediate danger of relegation to a lower division (Team A) and another team was not affected by the result (Team B). Using within-country variation, our difference-in-difference analysis reveals that the more corrupt the country, according to Corruption Perceptions Index, the higher is the probability that Team A would achieve the desired result in the sensitive games relative to achieving this result in other, non-sensitive games against the same team. We also find that in the later stages of the following year, the probability that Team A would lose against Team B compared to losing against a similar team (usually better than Team B) is significantly higher in more corrupt countries than in less corrupt countries. This result serves as evidence of quid pro quo behavior. (JEL A12, D73, C93, Z20).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)364-394
Number of pages31
JournalJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1 Aug 2018


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