TY - JOUR
T1 - Contests with a constrained choice set of effort
AU - Klunover, Doron
AU - Morgan, John
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2020/11
Y1 - 2020/11
N2 - We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that all equilibria are near the unconstrained equilibrium. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the case when players have different prize evaluations.
AB - We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that all equilibria are near the unconstrained equilibrium. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the case when players have different prize evaluations.
KW - Constrained choice set of effort
KW - Contests
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85090410168&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109559
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109559
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AN - SCOPUS:85090410168
SN - 0165-1765
VL - 196
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
M1 - 109559
ER -