TY - GEN
T1 - Computing the shapley value for ride-sharing and routing games
AU - Levinger, Chaya
AU - Hazon, Noam
AU - Azaria, Amos
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). All rights reserved.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Ride-sharing services are gaining popularity and are crucial for a sustainable environment. A special case in which such services are most applicable, is the last mile variant. In this variant it is assumed that all the passengers are positioned at the same origin location (e.g. an airport), and each have a different destination. One of the major issues in a shared ride is fairly splitting of the ride cost among the passengers. In this paper we use the Shapley value, which is one of the most significant solution concepts in cooperative game theory, for fairly splitting the cost of a shared ride. We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario there exists a fixed priority order in which the passengers are dropped-off (e.g. elderly, injured etc.), and we show a method for efficient computation of the Shapley value in this setting. Our results are also applicable for efficient computation of the Shapley value in routing games. In the second scenario there is no predetermined priority order, and we show that the Shapley value cannot be efficiently computed in this setting.
AB - Ride-sharing services are gaining popularity and are crucial for a sustainable environment. A special case in which such services are most applicable, is the last mile variant. In this variant it is assumed that all the passengers are positioned at the same origin location (e.g. an airport), and each have a different destination. One of the major issues in a shared ride is fairly splitting of the ride cost among the passengers. In this paper we use the Shapley value, which is one of the most significant solution concepts in cooperative game theory, for fairly splitting the cost of a shared ride. We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario there exists a fixed priority order in which the passengers are dropped-off (e.g. elderly, injured etc.), and we show a method for efficient computation of the Shapley value in this setting. Our results are also applicable for efficient computation of the Shapley value in routing games. In the second scenario there is no predetermined priority order, and we show that the Shapley value cannot be efficiently computed in this setting.
KW - Cost Allocation
KW - Ride-Sharing
KW - Shapley Value
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85096645980&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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AN - SCOPUS:85096645980
T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
SP - 1895
EP - 1897
BT - Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2020
A2 - An, Bo
A2 - El Fallah Seghrouchni, Amal
A2 - Sukthankar, Gita
T2 - 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2020
Y2 - 9 May 2020 through 13 May 2020
ER -