TY - JOUR
T1 - Complaining about noncompliance with the minimum wage law
AU - Yaniv, Gideon
PY - 1994/9
Y1 - 1994/9
N2 - Government enforcement of the minimum wage law is mainly initiated by workers' complaints of minimum wage violations. However, no attempt has been made in the growing literature on noncompliance to explore the role of labor market and enforcement parameters in generating an incentive for complaining, nor to explicitly incorporate the risk of complaining into the noncompliance decision. Addressing the issue of complaining, the present paper identifies the determinants of the decision to complain and examines the implications of a complaint-based enforcement system on the incentive for noncompliance and on labor market equilibrium.
AB - Government enforcement of the minimum wage law is mainly initiated by workers' complaints of minimum wage violations. However, no attempt has been made in the growing literature on noncompliance to explore the role of labor market and enforcement parameters in generating an incentive for complaining, nor to explicitly incorporate the risk of complaining into the noncompliance decision. Addressing the issue of complaining, the present paper identifies the determinants of the decision to complain and examines the implications of a complaint-based enforcement system on the incentive for noncompliance and on labor market equilibrium.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0039645307&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0144-8188(94)90049-3
DO - 10.1016/0144-8188(94)90049-3
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AN - SCOPUS:0039645307
SN - 0144-8188
VL - 14
SP - 351
EP - 362
JO - International Review of Law and Economics
JF - International Review of Law and Economics
IS - 3
ER -