Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection

Guy Elaad; Artyom Jelnov

doi:10.1007/s11238-018-9669-5

Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection

Guy Elaad, Artyom Jelnov

Department of Economics and Business Administration

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We analyze a game between three players: two Athletes and an Inspector. Two athletes compete with each other and both may cheat to increase their chances of victory. The Inspector wishes to detect incidents of cheating, and performs tests on athletes to detect cheating. The test is costly for the Inspector. Both probability of cheating and that of testing decrease as cost of inspection diminishes.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	375-387
Number of pages	13
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume	85
Issue number	3-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-018-9669-5
State	Published - 1 Oct 2018

Keywords

Cheating
Contest
Doping
Inspection

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10.1007/s11238-018-9669-5

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Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection

Abstract

Keywords

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