Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection

Guy Elaad, Artyom Jelnov

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We analyze a game between three players: two Athletes and an Inspector. Two athletes compete with each other and both may cheat to increase their chances of victory. The Inspector wishes to detect incidents of cheating, and performs tests on athletes to detect cheating. The test is costly for the Inspector. Both probability of cheating and that of testing decrease as cost of inspection diminishes.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)375-387
Number of pages13
JournalTheory and Decision
Issue number3-4
StatePublished - 1 Oct 2018


  • Cheating
  • Contest
  • Doping
  • Inspection


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