Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets

Dvir Gilor; Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi

doi:10.1016/j.artint.2023.104022

Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets

Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present an ascending-price mechanism for a multi-sided market with a variety of participants, such as manufacturers, logistics agents, insurance providers, and assemblers. Each deal in the market may consist of a combination of agents from separate categories, and different such combinations are simultaneously allowed. This flexibility lets multiple intersecting markets be resolved as a single global market. Our mechanism is obviously-truthful, strongly budget-balanced, individually rational, and attains almost the optimal gain-from-trade when the market for every allowed combination of categories is sufficiently large. We evaluate the performance of the suggested mechanism with experiments on real stock market data and synthetically produced data.

Original language	English
Article number	104022
Journal	Artificial Intelligence
Volume	325
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2023.104022
State	Published - Dec 2023

Keywords

Multi-sided markets
Strong budget balance
Truthful auctions

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10.1016/j.artint.2023.104022

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Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets

Abstract

Keywords

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