Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets

Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We present an ascending-price mechanism for a multi-sided market with a variety of participants, such as manufacturers, logistics agents, insurance providers, and assemblers. Each deal in the market may consist of a combination of agents from separate categories, and different such combinations are simultaneously allowed. This flexibility lets multiple intersecting markets be resolved as a single global market. Our mechanism is obviously-truthful, strongly budget-balanced, individually rational, and attains almost the optimal gain-from-trade when the market for every allowed combination of categories is sufficiently large. We evaluate the performance of the suggested mechanism with experiments on real stock market data and synthetically produced data.

Original languageEnglish
Article number104022
JournalArtificial Intelligence
Volume325
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2023

Keywords

  • Multi-sided markets
  • Strong budget balance
  • Truthful auctions

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