Abstract
A treatment prescribed by an incompetent expert can cause long-term damage. However, this damage may not be recognized in the short term. I propose a theoretical model in which an incompetent expert can act dishonestly. Specifically, she can prescribe an improper treatment, which seems to be effective in the short-term but has long-term negative side effects. I show that, surprisingly, the possibility of dishonest behavior may encourage consumers to approach experts and enhance social welfare.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1023-1031 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Oct 2025 |
Keywords
- addiction
- competence
- experts