TY - JOUR
T1 - Achieving cooperation under privacy concerns
AU - Dziuda, Wioletta
AU - Gradwohl, Ronen
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - Two players choose whether to cooperate on a project. Each of them is endowed with some evidence, and if both possess a sufficient amount, then cooperation is profitable. In order to facilitate cooperation, the players reveal evidence to one another. However, some players are concerned about privacy, and so revelation of evidence that does not result in cooperation is costly. We show that in equilibrium evidence can be exchanged both incrementally and all at once, and identify conditions under which the different rates of evidence exchange are optimal.
AB - Two players choose whether to cooperate on a project. Each of them is endowed with some evidence, and if both possess a sufficient amount, then cooperation is profitable. In order to facilitate cooperation, the players reveal evidence to one another. However, some players are concerned about privacy, and so revelation of evidence that does not result in cooperation is costly. We show that in equilibrium evidence can be exchanged both incrementally and all at once, and identify conditions under which the different rates of evidence exchange are optimal.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84938078433&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1257/mic.20140056
DO - 10.1257/mic.20140056
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AN - SCOPUS:84938078433
SN - 1945-7669
VL - 7
SP - 142
EP - 173
JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
IS - 3
ER -