A global multi-sided market with ascending-price mechanism

Rica Gonen; Erel Segal-Halevi

A global multi-sided market with ascending-price mechanism

Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present an ascending-price mechanism for a multi-sided market with a variety of participants, such as manufacturers, logistics agents, insurance providers, and assemblers. Each deal in the market may consist of a combination of agents from separate categories, and different such combinations are simultaneously allowed. This flexibility lets multiple intersecting markets be resolved as a single global market. Our mechanism is obviously-truthful, strongly budget-balanced, individually rational, and attains almost the optimal gain-from-trade when the market is sufficiently large.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2021
Pages	1503-1505
Number of pages	3
ISBN (Electronic)	9781713832621
State	Published - 2021
Event	20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2021 - Virtual, Online Duration: 3 May 2021 → 7 May 2021

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume	3
ISSN (Print)	1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)	1558-2914

Conference

Conference	20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2021
City	Virtual, Online
Period	3/05/21 → 7/05/21

Keywords

Multi-Sided Markets
Strong Budget Balance
Truthful Auctions

Cite this

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title = "A global multi-sided market with ascending-price mechanism",

abstract = "We present an ascending-price mechanism for a multi-sided market with a variety of participants, such as manufacturers, logistics agents, insurance providers, and assemblers. Each deal in the market may consist of a combination of agents from separate categories, and different such combinations are simultaneously allowed. This flexibility lets multiple intersecting markets be resolved as a single global market. Our mechanism is obviously-truthful, strongly budget-balanced, individually rational, and attains almost the optimal gain-from-trade when the market is sufficiently large.",

keywords = "Multi-Sided Markets, Strong Budget Balance, Truthful Auctions",

author = "Rica Gonen and Erel Segal-Halevi",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.; 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2021 ; Conference date: 03-05-2021 Through 07-05-2021",

year = "2021",

language = "אנגלית",

series = "Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS",

pages = "1503--1505",

booktitle = "20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2021",

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Gonen, R & Segal-Halevi, E 2021, A global multi-sided market with ascending-price mechanism. in 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2021. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 3, pp. 1503-1505, 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2021, Virtual, Online, 3/05/21.

A global multi-sided market with ascending-price mechanism. / Gonen, Rica; Segal-Halevi, Erel.
20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2021. 2021. p. 1503-1505 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS; Vol. 3).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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A global multi-sided market with ascending-price mechanism

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Keywords

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