@inproceedings{4bfaeea2daaf4ac6a4221099fb7d6cac,
title = "Tradeoffs between incentive mechanisms in boolean games",
abstract = "Two incentive mechanisms for Boolean games were proposed recently - taxation schemes and side payments. Both mechanisms have been shown to be able to secure a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) for Boolean games. A complete characterization of outcomes that can be transformed to PNEs is given for each of the two incentive mechanisms. Side payments are proved to be a weaker mechanism in the sense that the outcomes that they can transform to PNEs are a subset of those transformable by taxation. A family of social-network-based Boolean games, which demonstrates the differences between the two mechanisms for securing a PNE, is presented. A distributed search algorithm for finding the side payments needed for securing a PNE is proposed. An empirical evaluation demonstrates the properties of the two mechanisms on the family of social-network-based Boolean games.",
author = "Vadim Levit and Zohar Komarovsky and Tal Grinshpoun and Amnon Meisels",
year = "2015",
language = "אנגלית",
series = "IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence",
pages = "68--74",
editor = "Michael Wooldridge and Qiang Yang",
booktitle = "IJCAI 2015 - Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence",
note = "24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2015 ; Conference date: 25-07-2015 Through 31-07-2015",
}