ملخص
We incorporate expressive utility into Börgers’ (2004) canonical symmetric model of costly voting. It is shown that, under reasonable conditions, there exist two types of Bayesian Equilibria, those in which voters vote instrumentally and those in which they vote expressively. We show that equilibria in which voting is expressive is characterized by higher turnout and higher welfare. It is also shown that, in contrast to Borgers, when voting is expressive, turnout is too low.
| اللغة الأصلية | الإنجليزيّة |
|---|---|
| الصفحات (من إلى) | 99-104 |
| عدد الصفحات | 6 |
| دورية | Mathematical Social Sciences |
| مستوى الصوت | 127 |
| المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء | |
| حالة النشر | نُشِر - يناير 2024 |
| منشور خارجيًا | نعم |
بصمة
أدرس بدقة موضوعات البحث “Costly expressive voting'. فهما يشكلان معًا بصمة فريدة.قم بذكر هذا
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