Corruption and sensitive soccer games: Cross-country evidence

Guy Elaad, Alex Krumer, Jeffrey Kantor

نتاج البحث: نشر في مجلةمقالةمراجعة النظراء

19 اقتباسات (Scopus)

ملخص

We utilize data from sensitive soccer games in 75 countries between the years 2001 and 2013. In these games one team was in immediate danger of relegation to a lower division (Team A) and another team was not affected by the result (Team B). Using within-country variation, our difference-in-difference analysis reveals that the more corrupt the country, according to Corruption Perceptions Index, the higher is the probability that Team A would achieve the desired result in the sensitive games relative to achieving this result in other, non-sensitive games against the same team. We also find that in the later stages of the following year, the probability that Team A would lose against Team B compared to losing against a similar team (usually better than Team B) is significantly higher in more corrupt countries than in less corrupt countries. This result serves as evidence of quid pro quo behavior. (JEL A12, D73, C93, Z20).

اللغة الأصليةالإنجليزيّة
الصفحات (من إلى)364-394
عدد الصفحات31
دوريةJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization
مستوى الصوت34
رقم الإصدار3
المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء
حالة النشرنُشِر - 1 أغسطس 2018
منشور خارجيًانعم

بصمة

أدرس بدقة موضوعات البحث “Corruption and sensitive soccer games: Cross-country evidence'. فهما يشكلان معًا بصمة فريدة.

قم بذكر هذا