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'Blackmailing the army' - 'Strategic Military Refusal' as policy and doctrine enforcement: the formation of a new security agent

  • Udi Lebel

نتاج البحث: نشر في مجلةمقالةمراجعة النظراء

14 اقتباسات (Scopus)

ملخص

The study shows how 'strategic military refusal' in Israel developed as a rational and institutional means to influence security policies. As opposed to the perspective that sees military refusal as a spontaneous individual act, the study illustrates how organizations operate to distribute military refusal in order to pressure decision-makers to change their military policies. This strategy has proven to be effective when the military is involved with groups that threaten it with refusal - which threatens the military's operational ability and its official and apolitical image. These include soldiers whose civilian authorities, rather than their military commanders, are perceived as an epistemic authority regarding security issues. The case study refers to the impact of strategic military refusal in Israel on security policies and the military doctrine. This was influenced by leftist groups, which, although they belonged to the parliamentary opposition, had dominant presence in the military ranks. Furthermore, the study examines the effect of the use of strategic military refusal on the model of military recruitment.

اللغة الأصليةالإنجليزيّة
الصفحات (من إلى)297-328
عدد الصفحات32
دوريةSmall Wars and Insurgencies
مستوى الصوت25
رقم الإصدار2
المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء
حالة النشرنُشِر - مارس 2014

بصمة

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